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Introduction
Since 1999, the European Union (EU) has been implementing the principle of mutual 
recognition (MR), which is referred to as the cornerstone of judicial cooperation in 
criminal matters.1 The principle of mutual recognition assumes that decisions of the ju-
dicial authorities of one Member State should as far as possible take effect automatically 
in all other Member States of the EU.2 Mutual recognition is based on a presumption 
of mutual trust. The logic is that “the extraterritoriality of judicial decisions, created by 
mutual recognition, will only be accepted if there is a sufficiently high level of mutual 
trust between Member States”.3 
Mutual trust can therefore be regarded as a prerequisite for the principle of mutual 
recognition, or its ‘twin brother’. Mutual trust, as an idea, was initially perceived as a po-
litical postulate. However, along with progress towards judicial cooperation in criminal 
matters it became a systemic principle, proclaimed not only as a cornerstone in the Area 
of Freedom, Security and Justice, but also as a catalyst for integration.4 There is no legal 
definition of ‘mutual trust’ and, as was aptly observed by T. Ostropolski, the term lacks 
an explicit normative basis.5 The meaning of the principle can be – at least partially – 
recalled from treaties, texts of different legal instruments and policy documents. Con-
versely, the mutual recognition principle currently has a strong legal basis in EU law. 
1 Presidency Conclusions, Tampere European Council 15 and 16 October 1999, http://www.
europarl.europa.eu/summits/tam_en.htm [access: 17.01.2018].
2 For more on mutual recognition vid. for example: L. Klimek, Mutual recognition of Judicial 
Decisions in European Criminal Law, Bratislava 2017.
3 A. Willems, Mutual Trust as a term of art in EU Criminal Law: Revealing its hybrid character, in 
“European Journal of Legal Studies” 2016, vol. 9, p. 213.
4 Cf. judgment of the Polish Constitutional Court of 16 November 2011 in case no. SK 45/09. 
5 T. Ostropolski, The CJEU as a Defender of Mutual Trust, in “New Journal of European Criminal 
Law” 2015, vol. 6, p.166.
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The Treaty of Lisbon gave the principle of mutual recognition a pivotal role in the move 
towards judicial cooperation in criminal matters.6
The Council and the Commission have rather quickly revised their attitudes towards 
the factual level of trust between member states. The same could be said of the Euro-
pean Parliament, which opted for complex regulation of procedural rights to ensure at 
least a minimal level of common guarantees in Member States. Unlike the other EU 
Institutions, the Court of Justice of The European Union (CJEU) has become the most 
important advocate of mutual trust. The Court has upheld the presumption of trust and 
has become one of its strongest defenders.7 Reference to mutual trust was an important 
part of the Court’s reasoning in many decisions. However, it can be noted that even the 
CJEU’s case law in this regard has been far from uniform over the course of time.
In this article we will try to present how mutual trust is perceived by the EU Court 
and how this view has evolved. In addition, analysis of these judgments will be comple-
mented by the views of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the Ger-
man Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht, BVerfG). This will help in form-
ing a certain concept for the interpretation of mutual trust by European courts acting on 
different jurisdiction levels.
Mutual Trust as a Prerequisite for  
the Principle of Mutual Recognition
Mutual recognition is not a new concept. The first attempt to introduce mutual recog-
nition in the area of criminal law in Europe was seen in the Council of Europe’s con-
ventions adopted in the 1960s and 1970s.8 They proved to be unsuccessful, especially due 
to the lack of trust between states. At the EU level, mutual recognition was recognised as 
a cornerstone of judicial co-operation in criminal matters during the Tampere European 
Council in 1999.9 Just one year later, the European Commission stated that the traditional 
system of co-operation is not only slow, but also cumbersome, and sometimes it is quite 
uncertain what results a  judge or prosecutor who makes a  request will get.10 It argued 
6 In accordance with art. 82(1) Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union: Judicial coop-
eration in criminal matters in the Union shall be based on the principle of mutual recognition of judg-
ments and judicial decisions and shall include the approximation of the laws and regulations of the 
Member States.
7 T. Ostropolski, op. cit., p. 166.
8 For example: European Convention on the Punishment of Road Traffic Offences of 30 No-
vember 1964, European Treaty Series no. 052 [1964].
9 Presidency Conclusions, Tampere European Council 15 and 16 October 1999.
10 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament – Mutual 
recognition of Final Decisions in criminal matters /* COM/2000/0495 final */, p. 2.
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that judicial co-operation might also benefit from the concept of mutual recognition. 
Then, the Commission introduced a Program of Measures to Implement the Principle 
of Mutual Recognition of Decisions in Criminal Matters. This document sheds light on 
the specific relationship between mutual recognition and mutual trust. It stipulates that: 
“Implementation of the principle of mutual recognition of decisions in criminal mat-
ters presupposes that Member States have trust in each other’s’ criminal justice systems. 
That trust is grounded, in particular, on their shared commitment to the principles of 
freedom, democracy and respect for human rights, fundamental freedoms and the rule 
of law”.11 This begs the question of whether the presumption that Member States would 
trust each other was justified and rational. At that time, no measures aimed at mitigating 
the differences in the criminal legal systems of member states or approximate minimal 
procedural rights were envisaged in the treaties. Leaving this aside, it can be said that at 
the outset there was a strong belief that the level of trust between states – all of which 
were already parties to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) – was 
high, which was reflected in the different instruments stipulated in secondary law.
Over time, the wording used to describe mutual trust in different MR instruments 
has changed significantly. This can be shown in the examples of different phrases used in 
MR instruments. The framework decision (FD) on the first, and so far most important, 
mutual recognition measure – the European Arrest Warrant (EAW)12 declares that the 
level of confidence between Member States is high.13 However, in as early as 2008, in 
the FD on custodial sentences we read that mutual recognition ‘should become the cor-
nerstone’ of cooperation and – rather oddly – that relations between Member States ‘are 
characterised by special mutual confidence’.14 This change in tone might therefore reflect 
11 Programme of measures to implement the principle of mutual recognition of decisions in crim-
inal matters (Official Journal L C 12/10 of 15 January 2001).
12 Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant 
and the surrender procedures between Member States as amended by the Council Frame-
work Decision 2009/299/JHA of 26 February 2009 amending by the Framework Decisions 
2002/584/JHA, 2005/214/JHA, 2006/783/JHA, 2008/909/JHA and 2008/947/JHA, thereby 
enhancing the procedural rights of persons and fostering the application of the principle of 
mutual recognition to decisions rendered in the absence of the person concerned at the trial 
(Official Journal L 81/14 of 27 March 2009).
13 In accordance with recital 10 of FD EAW The mechanism of the European arrest warrant is based 
on a high level of confidence between Member States.
14 Council Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA of 27 November 2008 on the application of the 
principle of mutual recognition to judgments in criminal matters imposing custodial sentences 
or measures involving deprivation of liberty for the purpose of their enforcement in the Euro-
pean Union (Official Journal L 327/27 of 5 December 2008) as amended by Council Frame-
work Decision 2009/299/JHA of 26 February 2009 amending by the Framework Decisions 
2002/584/JHA, 2005/214/JHA, 2006/783/JHA, 2008/909/JHA and 2008/947/JHA, thereby 
enhancing the procedural rights of persons and fostering the application of the principle of 
mutual recognition to decisions rendered in the absence of the person concerned at the trial.
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the real level of trust between member states. As was rightly observed by A. Willems,15 
examples of the effects of these doubts regarding foreign criminal proceedings are also 
visible in the most recent MR instruments. The 2014 FD on the European Investiga-
tion Order (EIO),16 explicitly acknowledges that the trust presumption is rebuttable and 
introduces for the first time the explicit ‘human rights’ refusal ground. 
The growing scepticism towards mutual trust might stem from the first years’ expe-
riences of the EAW, the introduction of which has caused a lot of controversy.17 This 
has concerned, among other things, the partial abolition of dual criminality, which was 
challenged on the grounds that it breached the principle of legality and the principles of 
equality and non-discrimination.18 The most fundamental issue for the legitimacy of the 
EAW (and what could also be accurate for other MR instruments) is whether the MR 
system is compatible with human rights. Therefore, significant changes in the refusal 
grounds catalogue of the EIO (described above) are not a big surprise.  
The Case Law of the CJEU
At the outset it should be noted that the jurisdiction of the CJEU with regard to cooper-
ation in criminal matters was limited until 1st December 2014.19 After the Lisbon Treaty 
came into force there was a 5-year transition period concerning instruments adopted 
before the coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty. A significant amount of the case law 
of the CJEU was devoted to the EAW.20 The CJEU has underlined many times that the 
15 Cf. A. Willems, op. cit. p. 219.
16 Directive 2014/41/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 April 2014 regard-
ing the European investigation order in criminal matters (Official Journal L 130/1 of 1 May 
2014).
17 See for example: E. Guild, L. Martin (Ed), Still not resolved? Constitutional Issues of the Euro-
pean Arrest Warrant: a Look at Challenges Ahead after the Lessons Learned from the Pasty, https://
www.utwente.nl/en/bms/pa/staff/marin/Still%20not%20resolved%20Constitutional%20
Challenges%20to%20the%20European%20Arrest%20Warrant.pdf [access: 02.01.2018].
18 Case C-303/05 Advocaten voor de Wereld, ECLI:EU:C:2007:261. 
19 See Article 10 (1) of Protocol 36 annexed to the Treaty of Lisbon (consolidated version Official 
Journal C 326/2001 of 26 October 2012).
20 Cf. cases: C-303/05 Advocaten voor de Wereld, ECLI:EU:C:2007:261; C-66/08 Kozłowski, 
ECLI:EU:C:2008:437; C-296/08 PPU Santesteban Goicoechea, ECLI:EU:C:2008:457; 
C-388/08 PPU Leymann and Pustovarov, ECLI:EU:C:2008:669; C-123/08 Wolzen-
burg, ECLI:EU:C:2009:616; C-261/09 Mantello, ECLI:EU:C:2010:683; C-306/09 I.B., 
ECLI:EU:C:2010:626; C-192/12 PPU West, ECLI:EU:C:2012:404; C-42/11 Lopes da 
Silva Jorge, ECLI:EU:C:2012:517; C-396/11 Radu, ECLI:EU:C:2013:39; C-399/11 Mel-
loni, ECLI:EU:C:2013:107; C-168/13 PPU F., ECLI:EU:C:2013:358; C-237/15 PPU La-
nigan, ECLI:EU:C:2015:474; C-463/15 PPU A,  ECLI:EU:C:2015:634; C-241/15 Bob-Dogi, 
ECLI:EU:C:2016:385.
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“EAW must be executed on the basis of the principle of mutual recognition and in ac-
cordance with the provisions of the framework decision”. As S. Peers rightly observed, 
the case law of the CJEU “focuses overwhelmingly on the efficient application of the 
European Arrest Warrant”,21 which, however, can also apply respectively to other mutual 
recognition instruments. As can be seen, even with regard to human rights objections, 
the core argument of the Court was that Member State have mutual trust in each other’s 
criminal systems.
In the ground-breaking case Advocaten voor de Wereld,22 answering the allegation that 
(only) partial abolition of dual criminality with regard to 32 offences23 breached the prin-
ciples of equality and non-discrimination, the CJEU held that: “The Council was able to 
form the view, on the basis of the principle of mutual recognition and in the light of the 
high degree of trust and solidarity between the Member States, that, whether by reason 
of their inherent nature or by reason of the punishment (…), the categories of offences 
in question feature among those the seriousness of which in terms of adversely affect-
ing public order and public safety justifies dispensing with the verification of double 
criminality”.24 
Already then, the argument that there was a high degree of trust and solidarity was 
an important part of the Court’s reasoning. However, the judgments were criticised by 
many, who argued that “to a certain extent the impression prevails that the Court chose 
somewhat easy arguments to dispose of some rather difficult issues”.25
 Subsequently, in Gözütok and Brügge,26 the Court was asked whether the ne bis in 
idem principle covers the situation where criminal proceedings have been definitively 
discontinued due to a settlement before the prosecuting authority (without any involve-
ment of the judge at that phase). The CJEU answered positively, which was met with 
the surprise of many Member States, as during the hearing it had argued the opposite. 
In a famous statement, the CJEU – referring to the principle of mutual trust – held the 
following: “There is a necessary implication that the Member States have mutual trust 
in their criminal justice systems and that each of them recognises the criminal law in 
force in the other Member States even when the outcome would be different if its own 
national law were applied”.
21 S. Peers, EU Justice and Home Affairs Law: Volume II: EU Criminal Law, Policing, and Civil 
Law, Oxford 2016, p. 99.
22 Case C-303/05.
23 On partial abolition of double criminality requirement vid. more: Rethinking international coop-
eration in criminal matters. Moving beyond actors, bringing logic back, footed in reality, eds. G. Ver-
meulen, W. De Bondt ,C. Ryckman, Antwerp 2012.
24 Case C-303/05, § 57–58.
25 F. Geyer, European Arrest Warrant: Advocaten voor de Wereld VZW v. Leden van de Ministerraad, 
in: “European Constitutional Law Review” 2008, no. 4, p. 161.
26 Joined Cases C-187/01 and C-385/01 Gözütok and Brügge, ECLI:EU:C:2003:87.
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Further, in the ruling Melloni27 of 26 February 2014, the CJEU held that it is not 
permissible for Member States to have more rigorous rules as regards guarantees for the 
EAW following in absentia trials.
 In this case, Mr Melloni – an Italian businessman prosecuted for bankruptcy fraud, 
was hiding behind the justice system in Spain. The trial took place in Italy (which Mel-
loni was fully aware of ) but the accused decided not to attend it personally. Still, during 
the entire trial, he was represented by defence lawyers. When the conviction became 
final in 2004, Italy issued an EAW ordering Spain to surrender Mr Melloni. It is worth 
noting here that under the Spanish Constitution, if a person has been convicted in his 
or her absence (in absentia), surrender to the execution of that conviction must be made 
conditional on the right to challenge the conviction. Such a right was not foreseen in 
Italian criminal proceedings when Mr Melloni was convicted. Not surprisingly therefore, 
Mr Melloni referred to the right to a fair trial envisaged in the Spanish Constitution. 
He argued that his surrender to Italy would violate Spanish Constitutional standards, 
since in Italy he could not count on a retrial. From the case law of the Spanish constitu-
tion it follows that the described rule also applies to situations where the accused was 
represented by lawyers. Therefore, personal appearance is an element of this entitlement 
to retrial. At the same time, EU law does not create an equivalent system of guarantees 
as in Spanish law. Article 4a(1) FD EAW28 allows the Executing State to refuse the 
surrender or to make it conditional on the right to a retrial in a limited number of situ-
ations. Mr Melloni’s case would not fall into these exceptions since, in accordance with 
Art. 4a(1)(b) FD EAW, if the person convicted in his or her absence was defended and 
represented by a lawyer, the Executing State cannot refuse surrender. There was therefore 
a clear conflict between Spanish and EU law provisions. Given this fact, it should also 
be borne in mind that Art. 53 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union (Charter)29 states that “nothing in this Charter shall be interpreted as restricting 
or adversely affecting human rights and fundamental freedoms as recognized (…) by 
Union law and international law (…), including the ECHR and by the Member States’ 
constitutions’”. Does this mean, therefore, that referring to the Charter and its own con-
stitutional provisions, Spain should refuse the surrender of Mr Melloni (at least until his 
right to challenge the in absentia conviction were to be guaranteed)? According to the 
CJEU, that interpretation of Article 53 of the Charter would undermine the principle of 
the primacy of EU law. It would allow a Member State to disapply EU legal rules which 
27 Case C-399/11 and case C-237/15 PPU.
28 As amended by Council Framework Decision 2009/299/JHA of 26 February 2009 amending 
Framework Decisions 2002/584/JHA,  2005/214/JHA,  2006/783/JHA,  2008/909/JHA and 
2008/947/JHA, thereby enhancing the procedural rights of persons and fostering the applica-
tion of the principle of mutual recognition to decisions rendered in the absence of the person 
concerned at the trial.
29 Official Journal C 326/391 of 26 October 2012.
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are fully in compliance with the Charter, where they infringe the fundamental rights 
guaranteed by that State’s constitution. The Court referred again to the principle of 
mutual trust end effectiveness of the EAW, stating that (…) “casting doubt on the uni-
formity of the standard of protection of fundamental rights (…), would undermine the 
principles of mutual trust and recognition would, therefore, compromise the efficacy of 
that framework decision”. Therefore, the concept of mutual mutual trust stands behind 
an explanation of the rule that the Charter is to be used as a maximum standard of fun-
damental rights protection in EU criminal justice.30 
Mutual trust arguments were a very important part of the CJEU’s judgment on ac-
cess of the EU to the European Convention on Human Rights,31 i.e. Opinion 2/13 of 
18 December 2014,32 sometimes ironically called the ‘Christmas bombshell’.33 In short, 
it might be stated that in the Opinion, the Court criticised (on many different levels) 
the draft of the accession agreement. It stated that the draft agreement contained many 
fundamental errors and was incompatible with the treaties.
One of the core arguments of the CJEU related to mutual trust issues. In the Court’s 
opinion, the draft agreement may pose a danger to the autonomy of EU law because 
it may negatively affect the principle of mutual trust between Member States in the 
context of the respect for fundamental rights, which is particularly relevant in the Area 
of Freedom, Security and Justice. This danger stems from the obligation imposed on 
the Member States to check the observance of fundamental rights by all other party 
states even if they are EU Members. Such a requirement would impair the principle of 
mutual trust, as can be deduced from the following statement: “The principle of mutual 
trust between the Member States is of fundamental importance in EU law, given that 
it allows an area without internal borders to be created and maintained. That principle 
requires, particularly with regard to the area of freedom, security and justice, each of 
those States, save in exceptional circumstances, to consider all the other Member States 
to be complying with EU law and particularly with the fundamental rights recognised 
by EU law”.34
30 Which does not preclude higher human rights standards in other EU law areas, cf. case 
C-617/10 Åkerberg Fransson, ECLI:EU:C:2013:105.
31 For more information on the complicated issue of accession, vid.: P. Gragl, The Accession of the 
European Union to the European Convention on Human Rights, Oxford and Portland 2013.
32 Opinion 2/13 of 18 December 2014 on Accession of the European Union to the Eu-
ropean Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
ECLI:EU:C:2014:2454.
33 Cf. S. Douglass-Scott, Opinion 2/13 on EU accession to the ECHR: a Christmas bombshell from the 
European Court of Justice, http://verfassungsblog.de/opinion-213-eu-accession-echr-christmas-
bombshell-european-court-justice-2/#.VRGRofmG9uw [access: 11.01.2018].
34 Cf. Paragraph 191 of Opinion 2/13.
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The CJEU has repeated the arguments expressed in the Melloni case. The Court re-
quires that the ECtHR effectively respects its jurisprudence and thereby gives suprema-
cy to the primacy, unity and effectiveness of EU law over the protection of fundamental 
rights under the ECHR.35
As was presented above, the CJEU has consequently defended the principle of mutual 
trust. According to its judgments, mutual trust can be seen as a matter of ‘fundamen-
tal importance’ or as ‘one of the key specificities of EU law’.36 Bearing this in mind, it 
should be emphasised, however, that the principle of mutual trust is not absolute, and 
even in the opinion of its biggest defender the mutual trust assumption can be rebutted. 
In the ‘asylum case’ N.S.37 the Court held that EU law precludes a conclusive pre-
sumption that the Member State responsible under the Dublin Regulation38 observes 
fundamental rights. In this case, the court held that a Member State may not transfer an 
asylum seeker to another Member State (responsible under the Dublin regime) where 
there is a  risk that asylum seekers would face a  real risk of being subjected to inhu-
man or degrading treatment. Where the MS cannot be unaware of systemic deficiencies 
in the asylum procedure, both the presumption of mutual trust, and the presumption 
underlying the relevant legislation that asylum seekers will be treated in a way which 
complies with fundamental rights, must be regarded as rebuttable.39 The member state 
facing major operational problems in this case was Greece, which was severely affected 
by the migration crisis (the case concerned the period from 2008 to 2009). At that time 
in Greece there existed a systemic deficiency in the asylum procedure and in the recep-
tion conditions for asylum seekers. It is assumed that Member States participating in the 
Common European Asylum System observe fundamental rights, including the rights 
based on the Geneva Convention, and on the ECHR, and that the Member States can 
have confidence in each other in that regard. However, when it is evident (for example 
on the basis of ECtHR jurisprudence)40 that a given member state (or a third country) 
infringes the fundamental rights of the asylum seeker, such confidence is unfounded. 
Moreover, infringement of fundamental rights by the Member State responsible will not 
35 Cf. S. Reitemeyer, B. Pirker, Opinion 2/13 of the court of justice on access of the EU to the ECHR – 
one step ahead and two steps back, http://europeanlawblog.eu/2015/03/31/opinion-213-of-the-
court-of-justice-on-access-of-the-eu-to-the-echr-one-step-ahead-and-two-steps-back/ [ac-
cess: 21.12.2017].
36 T. Ostropolski, op. cit., p.166.
37 Joined Cases C-411/10 and C-493/10 N.S. and others, ECLI:EU:C:2011:865.
38 Council Regulation (EC) No 343/2003 of 18 February 2003 establishing the criteria and mech-
anisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an asylum application 
lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national (Official Journal L 50/1 of 25 
February 2003).
39 Paragraph 104 of Joined Cases C-411/10 and C-493/10 N.S. and others.
40 In this regard vid. also the judgment of the ECtHR of 21 January 2011 in the case MSS v Bel-
gium and Greece, (no. 30696/09).
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affect the obligations stemming from, among others, the Dublin Regulation of the other 
states. The Court clearly stated that if there are substantial grounds for believing that 
there are systemic flaws in the asylum procedure and reception conditions for asylum ap-
plicants in the Member State responsible, resulting in inhuman or degrading treatment, 
the transfer would be incompatible with Art. 4 of the Charter (Prohibition of torture 
and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment). Thus, if compliance with funda-
mental rights requires the Member State where the asylum seeker is present to examine 
the asylum application, that Member State has no choice but to do so.41
According to Mitsilegas, the N.S. judgment “constitutes a turning point in the evolu-
tion of inter-state cooperation in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, and signi-
fies the end of automaticity in inter-state cooperation not only as regards the Dublin 
Regulation, but also as regards cooperative systems in the fields of criminal law and civil 
law”.42 In turn, S. Peers asks whether this judgment means ‘the death of mutual trust’.43 
Probably not, but after this judgment one surely cannot automatically rely on the ‘mutual 
trust’ that other Member States will observe human rights and that, simply because they 
are a part of the EU, they should always unconditionally be treated as ‘safe’.
Another occasion where the CJEU confirmed that the assumption of mutual trust 
has certain limits was its judgment in the already well-described case Aranyosi and 
Căldăraru.44 This case concerned detention conditions in a state that issues the EAW. In 
the cases of Mr Aranyosi and Mr Căldăraru, the German court asked the CJEU whether 
it should execute an EAW despite the concerns raised by the fugitives about prison 
conditions in Hungary and Romania which had led to ECtHR rulings finding viola-
tions of Article 3 ECHR (freedom from torture or other inhuman or degrading treat-
ment or punishment). It was a general assumption for all instruments existing in judicial 
cooperation in criminal matters that Mutual recognition should ensure not only that 
sentences are enforced, but also that they will be served in a way that protects individual 
41 Cf. K. Lenaerts, The principle of mutual recognition in the area of freedom, security and justice, the 
fourth annual lecture at All Souls College, University of Oxford, 30 January 2015, https://www.
law.ox.ac.uk/sites/files/oxlaw/the_principle_of_mutual_recognition_in_the_area_of_free-
dom_judge_lenaerts.pdf [access: 22.12.2017].
42 V. Mitsilegas, The Limits of Mutual Trust in Europe’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice: From 
Automatic Inter-State Cooperation to the Slow Emergence of the Individual, “Yearbook of Euro-
pean Law” 2012, no. 31 ,p. 358.
43 S. Peers, Court of Justice: The NS and ME Opinions – The Death of “Mutual Trust”?, http://oppen-
heimer.mcgill.ca/IMG/pdf/Court_of_Justice-_The_NS_and_ME_Opinions_-_The_Death_
of_Mutual_Trust_.pdf [access: 15.12.2017].
44 Joined Cases C-404/15 and C-659/15 PPU, Aranyosi and Căldăraru, ECLI:EU:C:2016:198; Cf. 
S. Gáspár-Szilágyi, Joined Cases Aranyosi and Căldăraru: Converging Human Rights Standards, 
Mutual Trust and a New Ground for Postponing a European Arrest Warrant, “European Journal 
of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice” 2016, vol. 24, no. 2–3.
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rights.45 At the same time, however, the CJEU has so far highlighted that the list of 
refusal grounds is exhaustive and that refusal on general a human-rights based excep-
tion would undermine the effectiveness of the EAW system. However, these arguments 
seemed insufficient in this case. After the ECtHR’s judgments46 it was obvious that 
prisons in Romania and Hungary were dramatically overcrowded and that the execu-
tions of the EAW in these circumstances would not be defensible from the perspective 
of human rights protection. The CJEU had to consider whether in such cases judicial 
authority may or must refuse execution of the EAW, or whether it may or must make the 
surrender of that person conditional on obtaining information that detention conditions 
are compatible with fundamental rights.
At the beginning of the reasoning, the Court repeated that the list of refusal grounds 
is exhaustive and that an EAW may be made subject to only one of the conditions ex-
haustively laid down in Article 5 of that Framework Decision. Again – according to the 
Court – this is justified by the high level of trust between member states. The Court, there-
fore, did not change its approach and did not accept that in certain circumstances funda-
mental rights violations should be treated as an additional ground for refusal or non-exe-
cution.47 In its opinion, the mere finding that there is a real risk of inhuman or degrading 
treatment by virtue of the general conditions of detention in the issuing Member State 
cannot lead, in itself, to the refusal to execute a European arrest warrant. However, the 
Court stated that “limitations of the principles of mutual recognition and mutual trust 
between Member States can be made in exceptional circumstances”.48 As to the mer-
its, the Court held that if there is “a real risk of inhuman or degrading treatment, the 
execution of the warrant must be postponed but it cannot be abandoned”. Before that, 
however, the executing judicial authority must go through the specific ‘two-tier test’.
First, it must check whether there is a systemic failure to ensure decent prison con-
ditions in a  given State and second – a  ‘real risk’ that the individual fugitive would 
be subject to such conditions if the EAW is executed. If these ‘conditions’ are met, the 
executing State’s authorities have to postpone execution of the EAW until the detention 
conditions in the issuing State have improved. 
This case is another example where mutual trust cannot be achieved by a mere de-
cision or legislation. The CJEU tried to find a compromise between the effectiveness 
and integrity of the EAW and the need for human rights protection. This judgment, 
45 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament – Mutual 
recognition of Final Decisions in criminal matters, p. 2.
46 Cf. e.g. judgment of ECtHR of 10 March 2015 in the case Varga and Others v. Hungary, (Nos 
14097/12, 45135/12, 73712/12, 34001/13, 44055/13 and 64586/13).
47 Excellent considerations on this issue can be found in: opinion of Advocate General Eleanor 
Sharpston of 18 October 2012, case C-396/11 Ministerul Public – Parchetul de pe lângă Curtea de 
Apel Constanţa v Ciprian Vasile Radu, ECLI:EU:C:2012:648, § 70 et seq., 74 et seq.
48 Ibid. § 82.
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however, leaves many questions unanswered. First of all, it is not entirely clear how 
the test proposed by the CJEU should be proved and who bears the burden of proof. 
Sometimes it might be very difficult to present sufficient evidence that the entire deten-
tion system is inefficient. Another concern regards possible forum shopping to achieve 
impunity in cases where detention conditions have not been improved in a reasonable 
time. Problems regarding detention conditions cannot be solved easily and fast. Perhaps 
in the future this judgment will trigger a legislative initiative for minimum EU detention 
standards which was suggested by Advocate General Y. Bot in his opinion.49 
The Case Law of the ECtHR and the BVerfG
The case-law of the CJEU underlines the importance of mutual trust in cooperation 
within the EU, especially in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. Having anal-
ysed the reasoning of the CJEU, it is worth taking a closer look at the judgment of the 
BVerfG in a case related to the European Arrest Warrant (Order of 15 December 2015 – 
EAW II).50 Already, the past rulings of this court, such as the ‘Solange’ jurisprudence, 
have become model solutions, discussed and applied across Europe and beyond.51
The case concerned the surrender of an American citizen from Germany to Italy un-
der the EAW. It was issued for the purpose of executing a sentence imposed in Italy after 
trial in absentia. The German court had serious doubts about the procedural guarantees 
in Italy, and therefore asked the relevant Italian authorities for the necessary informa-
tion regarding national law. The German court tried to determine what kind of remedies 
the accused was entitled to and what provisions would apply in the case of a trial dur-
ing which the accused were not present. After the necessary information was provided, 
referring among other things to the principle of mutual trust and obligations set out in 
the FD EAW, the Düsseldorf Higher Regional Court stated that extradition in this case 
was lawful. This decision was appealed in the BVerfG, which found that executing the 
arrest warrant was contrary to the German legal order. The Court referred primarily to 
the constitutional aspects of criminal sentences, stating that in this case executing the 
Framework Decision on the European arrest warrant affects the principle of individual 
guilt, and thus the principle of the rule of law, and this forms part of the inalienable 
constitutional identity under the Basic Law (i.e. German Constitution). The Court also 
referred to the ECHR where the presence of the defence – be it in the initial proceed-
49 Opinion of Advocate Generaln Yves Bot of 3 March 2016, joined cases C-404/15 and C-659/15 
PPU Aranyosi and Căldăraru, ECLI:EU:C:2016:140.
50 Order of BVerfG of 15 December 2015 in case no. 2 BvR 2735/14.
51 T. Reinsbracher, M. Wendel, The Bundesverfassungsgericht’s European Arrest Warrant II Decision, 
in “Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law” 2016, vol. 23, p. 702.
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ings or upon retrial – is one of the essential requirements under Art. 6 ECHR (the right 
to a fair trial). BVerfG stressed that Italian procedural law, in the described case, did not 
provide the accused with the undeniable guarantee that he would have an opportunity 
to have a new hearing of evidence at the appeal stage. It found that the requested person 
who had been sentenced in his or her absence and who had not been informed about 
the trial and its conclusion should at least have been provided with the real opportunity 
to defend himself or herself effectively after having learned of the trial, in particular 
by presenting circumstances to the court that may exonerate himself or herself and by 
having them reviewed. The Italian criminal proceedings failed to ensure such standards 
at that time. In the opinion of the BVerfG, the Higher Regional Court failed to suffi-
ciently follow up on that issue. It contented itself with finding that a hearing of evidence 
in Italy was ‘in any case not impossible’. On these grounds, the BVerfG stated that the 
Italian criminal proceedings were not in compliance with the minimum guarantees laid 
down in the German Constitution. The key aspect of the judgement is a reference to the 
so called Identity Review Order (Identitätskontrolle), which is a review of the conformity 
of the standards of legal proceedings in the issuing state with the German national order. 
Under this principle, even if the procedure in the issuing state meets the EU standards, 
it still needs to abide by the key German constitutional standards. These standards could 
not be met in a situation where the accused, after his surrender to Italy, was not provided 
with a legal remedy with which he could have challenged the sentence rendered in his 
absence in a manner that safeguarded his rights of defence. Such rights under the Ger-
man constitution are inalienable and encompassed by the guarantee of human dignity.
Thereby, the BVerfG stated that the order of the Düsseldorf Higher Regional Court 
violated the fundamental rights of the accused in the main case under the Basic Law 
(Constitution) insofar as it declared the extradition under the EWA permissible. It rec-
ognized that the principle of mutual trust and the effectiveness of EU law must give way 
to the protection of fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution.52 The justifica-
tion for such a position was that the Member States were the ‘masters of the Treaties’, 
and that the validity and the primacy of Union law depends on their will. National law, 
therefore, in such cases limits the principle of the supremacy of EU law. In the Court’s 
opinion: “In general, sovereign acts of the European Union and acts of German public 
authority – to the extent that they are determined by Union law – are, due to the prece-
52 Cf. N. Gazeas, Die Europäische Beweisanordnung – Ein weiterer Schritt in die falsche Richtung?, 
in: “Zeitschrift für Rechtspolitik“ 2005, no. 1, p. 19, which indicates that the German parlia-
ment, when adopting the Council Framework Decision 2008/978/JHA of 18 December 2008 
on the European evidence warrant for the purpose of obtaining objects, documents and data 
for use in proceedings in criminal matters (Official Journal L 350/72 of 30 December 2008), 
proposed that due to the large differences between the criminal law systems in the Member 
States and the insufficient level of procedural guarantees in the Union, mutual recognition can-
not take place automatically and without any limitations.
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dence of application of European Union Law, not to be measured against the standard of 
the fundamental rights enshrined in the Basic Law. However, the precedence of applica-
tion of European Union Law is limited by the constitutional principles that are beyond 
the reach of European integration”.
The position of the German court underlines the conditionality of the principle of 
mutual trust. Regardless of considerations concerning, among other things, the principle 
of loyalty, the ruling of the German Constitutional Court is an example of a restrained 
approach to the principle of mutual trust.53 
Another decision which sets the way for the interpretation of the principle of mutual 
trust is the judgment of the ECtHR in the case of Avotiņš v. Lithuania.54 In this case, the 
ECtHR examined the compliance of the enforcement of the foreign judgement under 
the Regulation 44/2001 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judg-
ments in civil and commercial matters (known as ‘Brussels I’) with the ECHR. In this 
case, the ECtHR had, for the first time, to examine observance of the guarantees of 
a fair hearing in the context of mutual recognition in civil and commercial matters based 
on European Union law. Considering the scope of EU judicial cooperation it was only 
a matter of time before the ECtHR had to rule on the issue55 as it was predictable that 
the mutual recognition and enforcement of civil judgments can interfere with funda-
mental rights in many different ways. 
The case concerned a judgment of a Cypriot court ordering the applicant to pay a debt 
he had contracted with a Cypriot company, and an order made by the Latvian courts for 
the enforcement of the Cypriot judgment in Latvia. It is also worth noting at the out-
set that this case also concerns a judgment that was rendered in absentia (in this case in 
the absence of the defendant). In the applicant’s opinion, the Lithuanian court violated 
Article 6 of the ECHR (the right to a fair trial), due to the fact that it had authorised the 
53 The judgment was called ‘Solange III’, due to its bold claims against the priority of EU law and 
the system of protection of fundamental rights created within it. Cf. H. Satzger, Grund – und 
menschenrechtliche Grenzen für die Vollstreckung eines Europäischen Haftbefehls? – „Verfassungsg-
erichtliche Identitätskontrolle“ durch das BVerfG vs. Vollstreckungsaufschub bei „außergewöhnlichen 
Umständen“ nach dem EuGH, „Neue Zeitschrift für Strafrecht“ 2016, no. 9, pp. 514–522.
54 Judgment of ECtHR of 23 may 2016 in case Avotiņš v. Lithuania (no. 17502/07). Council 
Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (Official Journal L 12/1 of 16 Janu-
ary 2001). See also S. Ø. Johansen, EU law and the ECHR: the Bosphorus presumption is still alive 
and kicking – the case of Avotiņš v. Latvia, http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.com/2016/05/eu-law-
and-echr-bosphorus-presumption.html [access: 14.01.2018].
55 Cf. e. g.: in the case Pietro Pianese v. Italy and the Netherlands (no. 14929/08), an Italian citizen 
complained about detention based on the EAW,  alleging violations of Art. 5 of the Con-
vention. However, the ECtHR declared the applicant’s allegations inadmissible, because they 
were brought out of time and were manifestly ill-founded. In turn, in case Romeo Castaño v. 
Belgium (no. 8351/17), the ECtHR will check compliance the refusal to enforce EAW with the 
Convention.
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enforcement of the Cypriot judgment, although the decision had been delivered in 
breach of his defence rights and had thus been clearly unlawful.
The ECtHR held that there was no violation of Article 6 of the ECHR. The ap-
plicant could have used the remedies available under Cypriot law. His inaction and lack 
of diligence contributed to the situation to a large extent and he could have prevented 
it. The defendant signed the acknowledgment of debt deed, which contained a clause 
conferring jurisdiction to the Cypriot courts. He should have been aware of the conse-
quences of his actions and the possibility that the creditor would institute proceedings 
in this country. Regardless of the above and more than the ruling itself, in this particular 
case what is more interesting for us are the general observations of the court on the deli-
cate issue of application of EU law on the one hand and respect for fundamental rights 
envisaged in ECtHR on the other.
Although the ECtHR did not notice any infringement of the ECHR,  it pointed 
out that it is impossible to introduce a mechanical and automatic recognition system 
within the EU without providing the Member States with the opportunity to check the 
equivalence of the protection of fundamental rights.56 The ECtHR reiterated that, when 
applying European Union law, States are bound by the obligations they entered into 
on acceding to the ECHR. These obligations must be assessed in the light of the pre-
sumption established by the Court in the famous ‘Bosphorus’ judgment.57 This judgment 
introduced the presumption of equivalent protection of ECHR rights by the EU. How-
ever, “any such presumption can be rebutted if, in the circumstances of a particular case, 
it is considered that the protection of Convention rights was manifestly deficient”.58 The 
ECtHR stated that member states of an international organization are still liable under 
the ECHR for all acts and omissions of its organs regardless of whether the act or omis-
sion was a consequence of the necessity to comply with international legal obligations. 
In other words, the mere fact that a given Member State is applying EU law and execut-
ing a judgment issued by another EU Member State does not negate its obligation to 
check whether ECHR standards were met. 
In the Avotins case, the ECtHR confirmed that the Bosphorus presumption also applies 
to the mutual recognition mechanism. The Court observed, however, that this presump-
tion is applicable only when two conditions are met. First, if there is an ‘absence of any 
margin of manoeuvre’ on the part of the domestic courts and the deployment of the full po-
tential of the supervisory mechanism provided for by European Union law. In Avotins these 
conditions were fulfilled, as the Brussels I Regulation (as opposed to directives) is direct-
ly applicable and contains only limited grounds for refusal (applicable in marginal situa-
56 Cf. S. Ø. Johansen, op. cit.
57 Judgement of ECtHR of 30 June 2005 in case Bosphorus Hava Yolları Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim 
Şirketi v. Ireland (no. 45036/98).
58 Cf. Bosphorus Hava Yolları Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim Şirketi v. Ireland.
The Principle of Mutual Trust… | 199 
tions). According to the ECtHR, the Latvian courts did not have, therefore, any margin 
of manoeuvre in this case (which might be questioned as EU law does not regulate, for 
example, such matters as burden of proof with regard to fundamental rights observance 
which could arguably give some leeway to the executing court)59. With regard to the sec-
ond condition, the ECtHR held that it was met in this case since Mr Avotins had not 
advanced any specific argument concerning the interpretation of the Brussels I Regula-
tion and its compatibility with fundamental rights. Especially so, as there was no request 
that a preliminary ruling should have been sought from the CJEU. The passive attitude 
of the defendant with respect to his rights and legal actions supports the statement that 
the second condition was also met.
However, the mere finding that all the above-mentioned conditions have been met 
is not yet sufficient. Another important aspect that the executing court must take into 
account while recognising a  foreign judgment is whether the protection of ECtHR 
rights in the entire procedure is not ‘manifestly deficient’. The ECtHR has very clearly 
explained that obligation: “The Court must satisfy itself […] that the mutual recognition 
mechanisms do not leave any gap or particular situation which would render the protec-
tion of the human rights guaranteed by the Convention manifestly deficient. In doing so 
it takes into account, in a spirit of complementarity, the manner in which these mecha-
nisms operate and in particular the aim of effectiveness which they pursue. Nevertheless, 
it must verify that the principle of mutual recognition is not applied automatically and 
mechanically […] to the detriment of fundamental rights – which, the CJEU has also 
stressed, must be observed in this context […]. In this spirit, where the courts of a State 
which is both a Contracting Party to the Convention and a Member State of the Euro-
pean Union are called upon to apply a mutual recognition mechanism established by EU 
law, they must give full effect to that mechanism where the protection of Convention 
rights cannot be considered manifestly deficient”. 
How should this be interpreted in the light of the principle of mutual trust? Convinc-
ingly, the aspirations of absolute mutual trust have been negatively assessed.60 Obviously, 
the system of simplifying the migration of judgments in the EU has not been denied. 
The ECtHR did not undermine the basis of the simplified mechanism for the recogni-
tion and enforcement of judgments, in particular the introduction of a prohibition on 
reviewing foreign judgements as to their substance in the Member State in which rec-
ognition/enforcement is sought (the prohibition of révision au fond). However, according 
to the ECtHR, Member States must be able to investigate whether the proceedings in 
59 Cf. S. Ø. Johansen, op. cit.
60 G.  Biagioni, The Uneasy Balance Between Mutual Recognition of Judgments and Protection of 
Fundamental Rights, in “European Papers” 2016, Vol. 1, no. 2, p. 594, http://www.european-
papers.eu/fr/system/files/pdf_version/EP_EF_2016_I_036_Giacomo_Biagioni_1.pdf [access: 
12.01.2018].
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the issuing State do not violate the standards of the ECHR, even if this is not provided 
for in EU law.61 At the same time, it was emphasized that the level of protection of fun-
damental rights introduced by EU law cannot interfere with guarantees provided at the 
international level. The judgement of the ECtHR is clearly a  signal for a  revision of 
some of the legal features of EU judicial cooperation, and arguably not only in judicial 
cooperation in civil matters. 
Conclusions
The principle of mutual trust is often referred to in case-law and probably this trend 
will not change in the near future given that the presumption of trust is the basis for all 
mutual recognition instruments. Therefore, there is a need to clarify what the principle 
of mutual trust means exactly and how it is understood by courts. The decisions referred 
to in this paper have explained, at least to a certain extent, the content of the principle. 
Moreover, they have provided an example of the complex relationship between mutual 
trust, fundamental rights protections, mutual recognition and the enforcement of judg-
ments. Although the judgments relate to different aspects of cooperation and were is-
sued in different circumstances, in our opinion some general conclusions can be drawn. 
Firstly, courts seem more and more often to refer to the principle of mutual trust in the 
Area of Freedom, Security and Justice in their reasoning. The intensification of the refer-
ence to the mutual trust principle goes hand in hand, however, with the belief that the 
principle has certain limits. It is clear now that the presumption of mutual trust under 
certain circumstances is rebuttable. The common feature of all judgments is the nega-
tion of the absolute nature of the principle of mutual trust. The conditional nature of 
the principle of mutual trust stems from, among other things, the need for fundamental 
rights protection.62 
Secondly, the basis of the principle’s restriction is something which fundamentally dif-
ferentiates the CJEU, BVerfG and ECthR. Where the ECtHR indicates that the mini-
mum protection level should respond to the standard envisaged in the ECHR, the BVe-
fG recognizes as a priority the standards set by the German Constitution which cannot 
be reduced due to the abstract principle of trust. The CJEU refers to guarantees referred 
to directly in EU instruments. In Melloni, the CJEU for the first time set a minimum 
61 Ibid, p. 589.
62 Unfortunately, in the Union there are still serious deficiencies in the protection of fundamental 
rights. For example, due to bad conditions in prisons in Bulgaria, the German courts refused 
extradition to that country several times, information available at:http://www.euractiv.com/
section/justice-homeaffairs/news/German-courts-refuse-to-extradite-prisoners-to-bulgaria/ 
[access: 12.01.2018].
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of fundamental rights protection in criminal matters by reference to the European ordre 
public. The CJEU tried to create a common standard, a public order category which takes 
into account European requirements, and not only the characteristics of the national 
legal order. This means that the interpretation of the conditions for the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments may also be influenced by factors not directly indicated in the 
act (i.e. the principle of protection of fundamental rights).
Adoption of mutual trust as the basis for integration, and above all the mechanisms 
for recognition and enforcement of judgments is an ambitious project. Its content, how-
ever, must take into account the context and the conditions in which it operates – the 
aims of the regulations, but also the attitude of the national courts. Referred judgments 
make it clear that there are different approaches to the principle of mutual trust. Practice 
will show which point of view becomes the leading one, especially as the presumption 
of adequate protection of fundamental rights and the rule of law in all Member States is 
becoming increasingly questionable since the Commission took the unprecedented step 
of triggering the formal steps established in Article 7 of Treaty on the European Union63 
against Poland. The former convictions that in this Union of values it will not be necessary 
to apply penalties pursuant to Article 7 of the Union Treaty64 unfortunately turned out to be 
too optimistic. 
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summary
The Principle of Mutual Trust in the Area of Freedom, 
Security and Justice. analysis of Selected Case Law
The paper concerns the principle of mutual trust and its interpretation by the Court 
of Justice of the European Union as well as two other important European courts: the 
European Court of Human Rights and the German Constitutional Court. The paper 
presents the important change of direction in interpretation of the principle of mutual 
trust by the CJEU. Initially, the belief in the existence of mutual trust between member 
states was firm. Over time, however, it has turned out that even in the EU – which fol-
lows from a number of judgments of the ECtHR – violations of human rights some-
times happen. This dramatically undermines trust in foreign judicial systems. This led the 
CJEU to the conclusion that the principle of mutual trust is rebuttable and that in some 
circumstances limitations to the principles of mutual recognition and mutual trust can 
be made. This conclusion can be treated as an answer in the specific ‘judicial dialogue’ 
of the CJEU with the ECtHR and the German Constitutional Court – the two latter 
courts seemed to notice earlier that mutual trust between member states cannot be blind 
and unconditional. 
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mutual trust, mutual recognition
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